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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT
All the parties to the proceedings before the District Court
are listed in the caption.

The parties involved in this appeal

are Holly, Wells, Shirley Sontag, and Lucille Ditzenberger as
Appellants/Cross-Appellees and Joel Parker as Appellee/CrossAppellant.

The third-party claims against Lloyd J. Webb and The

Estate of Fred E. Parker have been settled.
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JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (j) (1998) .
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Issue:

Whether the trial court properly determined

that the parties had entered into a partnership agreement.
Standard of Review:

The applicable standard of review

to determine whether parties had created a partnership is as
follows:

"On review, this Court is obligated to view the

evidence and all inferences that may be drawn therefrom in a
light most supportive of the findings of the trier of fact.

The

findings and judgment of the trial court will not be distributed
when they are based on substantial, competent, admissible
evidence.

Nupetco Associates v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 881 (Utah

1983) .
2.

Issue:

Whether the trial court properly determined

that the real property used by the partnership prior to the death
of Fred Parker was a partnership asset.
Standard of Review:

Whether a particular asset belongs

to a partnership enterprise is a finding of fact.

Cutler v.

Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Utah 1975)
3.

Issue:

Whether the trial court properly determined

that there was clear and convincing evidence that Fred Parker
gave to Joel as a gift one-half of the capital contributions that
he has made to the partnership.
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Standard of Review:

"It rests primarily with the trial

court to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing"
and the test of the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a finding
under the clear and convincing standard is whether the evidence
is reasonably sufficient.

Lovett v. Continental Bank and Trust

Co., 4 Utah 2d 76, 286 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1955).
4.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in concluding

that, despite the unique facts of this case, Joel's labor was not
a capital contribution to the partnership.
Standard of Review:

The trial court's interpretation

of statutes is a question of law reviewed for correctness.
v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah 1993).

State

In interpreting

common law, the appellate court affords no deference to the lower
court.

Truiillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992).
Reference to Record Showing Preservation of Issue for

Appeal:

Defendant's Trial Brief, R. 122-23.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-3, -4, -5, - 22, -37(2) (1998).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This case arises out of a dispute between a decedent's

grandnephew, Joel Parker ("Joel"), and the decedent's legal heirs
(the "heirs") over whether the decedent, Fred Parker ("Fred"),
had entered into a partnership with Joel to carry on a cattle
ranching business ("the partnership") and how that partnership
should be wound up as a result of Fred's death.
250\22885 1
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Joel filed an

action against the legal heirs, daughters of the decedent; Lloyd
J. Webb (individually and as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Fred E. Parker) ("the executor"); and the Estate of
Fred E. Parker.

Joel alleged that he and his granduncle had

entered into a partnership which included in its scope both
cattle and certain real property located in Weber County, Utah
("the property").

He, therefore, sought declaratory relief and

damages under theories of unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel,
wrongful distribution and retention of property.

R. 1-17.

The

heirs brought an action against Joel seeking declaratory relief,
quiet title, accounting for partnership profits, profits or a
fair rental value of the property, and slander of title.

R. 31-

37.
After a bench trial on the merits, the trial court
found that a partnership existed between Joel and Fred, which
partnership included both the cattle and property.

The Court

also declared that based upon clear and convincing evidence, Fred
had gifted to Joel one-half of any money that he infused into the
partnership thereby giving the partners equal capital
contributions in the partnership.

The Court ordered the cattle

and the property sold and the net proceeds equally divided
between the parties.

The heirs appealed the trial court's

decision.
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B.

Courts of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court
Below
Joel Parker adopts the heirs description of the course

of proceedings and disposition in the court below.
C.

Statement of Facts
The record establishes the following undisputed facts

that are material to the issues on appeal:
The parties to this litigation are all relatives of Fred
Parker ("Fred") who was an eighty-year-old man living in Hailey,
Idaho, until he died on October 25, 1992. R. 252, 254.
Defendant/appellee Joel Parker ("Joel") was Fred's grandnephew
who lived in Ogden, Utah, and was approximately twenty-seven
years old at the time pertinent to this litigation.

R. 252, 254.

Plaintiffs/appellants Holly Wells, Shirley Sontag and Lucille
Ditzengerger were Fred's daughters and legal heirs ("the heirs")
who were respectively residents of California, Hawaii and Texas.
R. 252.
The trial court considered the quality of the parties'
personal relationships to Fred pivotal in analyzing the issues
raised in the bench trial.

R. 282, pp. 201-02.

Fred had been

married on numerous occasions and had children from one or more
of those marriages.

R. 253. The relationship between Fred and

his heirs was estranged and not close.

Id.

The heirs had no

contact with Fred and did not attend his funeral.

Id.

When

Joel's father called Shirley Sontag, one of Fred's heirs, to
notify her of Fred's funeral she replied "I don't feel I should

250\22885 1
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even be there because I did not come and see him when he was
alive."

R. 282, p. 56.

While the court found there was no

obligation for the heirs to remain in contact with Fred or attend
his funeral, it determined the estrangement in this relationship
to be "a critical fact when looking at the case."

R. 282, pp.

201-02.
By contrast, the relationship between Fred and Joel became
as close as that of a father to his son.

R. 253.

Although Joel

had known Fred since he was four or five years old, his
relationship with his grand uncle really developed in 1988 or
1989 when Joel went to the hospital to care for Fred after a bout
of pneumonia.

R. 282, p. 6.

Every other family member Fred had

called to take care of him had declined.

Id.

For a year or two, during and after Fred's recovery, Fred
and Joel spent time together discussing which of Joel's various
interests Fred might help Joel develop into a career.
7.

Id. at 6-

Fred initially was more serious than Joel in this quest.

Fred asked constantly,
we could get you going."

"What do you want to do?
Id. at 147-48.

. . . You know,

Fred's words were "with

your youth and my wisdom and age and cold-hard cash on the corner
of the table, there isn't nothing we can't do." Id. at 148.
Although Fred and Joel discussed careers in trucking and farming,
Fred repeatedly mentioned ranching as an option because it was a
profession that he had "loved . . . with all his heart and mind."
Id. at 6-9.
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In about 1990, Joel purchased his first heifer and began
raising it on a neighbor's property.

Id. at 10-11.

When Joel

was considering buying more cows, he invited Fred to come into
the business with him.
it?

Id. at 9.

"I go, do you want to get into

And he said yes, and how much money do you need?"

Id.

When

Joel responded that the heifers he intended to purchase would
cost about $2,000, Fred said, "Will $5,000 do?"
knows, maybe you will see something else."

He said, "Who

Id.

When Joel realized that the cows he had selected were
already sold, he asked Fred what to do with the $5,0 00 Fred had
sent him.

Id. at 12.

Because Fred instructed him to just hold

onto it, Joel created a checking account and deposited the money.
Id. at 12 & 45.

Joel understood at that time that he and Fred

had formed a partnership:

"My understanding is we were going to

start into the cattle and ranch business."
49.

Id. at 13 & 19, 144-

Their business plan was to reinvest any profits and "try to

build or establish something big."

Id. at 149.

From the inception of the partnership, Fred and Joel
operated on the premise that Fred would contribute all the money
while Joel contributed all the labor.

Id. at 148 & 85.

"That's

what I had, my youth, my work I am able to do, the stuff, that
was the value of me.

He had the money."

Id. at 73-74.

needed more money, he only needed to ask Fred for it.
If work needed to be done, Joel always did it:

250X22885 1

Id. at 45.

"I was the one

that was doing the deal, the work, handling everything.
the money man.

If Joel

He was

Because there is no way he could do the work I
^

was doing or set-up the things I set-up, or any of that."
96.

Id. at

Thus, Joel and Fred realized they were totally

interdependent and that their partnership would not work without
a full commitment from each of them.

Id. at 148-49.

Between March and May of 1990, Fred bought a total of
thirty-five heifers and a bull, which he sent to Joel for use in
their cattle operation.

Id. at 14-15

In August of 1990, Fred

purchased and sent another seven cows and eight calves.
elected to title all of the cattle in Joel's name.
282, pp. 37, 150. Plaintiff's Exhibits 14, 29.
Joel $3,300 for feed and expenses.

Fred

R. 254; R.

Fred then sent

R. 282, p. 20.

From the inception of the cattle partnership, Joel labored
single-handedly to care for the cattle and to perform tasks that
would minimize Fred's expenses.

Id. at 17.

He bartered

extensively to eliminate costs for the care, feed and pasturing
of the cattle.

Id. at 17 & 54.

Although he worked seven days a

week and was, at times, "on call" twenty-four hours a day, Joel
never kept track of his time nor did he ask Fred for compensation
for his labor.

Id. at 55 & 128.

Neither Joel nor Fred set-up books or records to keep track
of expenses for their cattle operation, but they did discuss
those expenses.

Id. at 21, 87-88.

Joel had no training in any

farm record-keeping method, although he was a high school
graduate.

Id. at 9.

Joel testified that, at that time, he just

did what he felt was right, and Fred had no problem with it.
at 105 & 87.
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When Joel asked Fred about the need for record„

Id.

keeping, Fred "would always basically just tell me don't worry
about it, we will take care of it, you know."

Id. at 21-22.

In 1990, Fred and Joel did discuss how to handle their
cattle partnership on their tax returns.

Joel suggested his

taking a third of the deduction on his taxes and allowing Fred
two-thirds because Joel believed that he did not need further
deductions.

Id. at 77. Both Joel and Fred believed that in

dealing with the IRS, some taxes were preferable to none because
"humongous losses" became a red flag to the IRS.

Id. at 78.

As soon as Joel and Fred accumulated their first cows, Fred
told Joel that their next step in the project was to locate
property.

Id. at 182-83.

Joel contacted real estate agents, and

Joel and Fred would look at any property that sounded promising.
Id.

In Joel's mind, it was "just implied that we was going to

grow into a cattle ranch, ranching cows, you know.
was on his way out.

Fred knew he

He didn't have a lot more years."

Id. at

182 Sc 13.
In the fall of 1990, after they determined that a 1000 acre
parcel in Weber County ("the property") would meet their needs,
Joel contacted the railroad that owned the property.

Id. at 152.

Fred told Joel, "You see what you can get worked out.
put together a good enough deal, we got the money."
35.

If you can

Id. at 154 &

Joel did all of the negotiating and successfully reduced the

purchase price from about $300,000 to $116,700.

Id. at 153 & 91.

Upon receiving the Offer to Purchase from the railroad, Joel
informed Fred that the sellers wanted to know what kind of entity
250\22885 1
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intended to purchase the property.

id,, at 33. After Fred

elected "partnership- as purchaser, he voluntarily filled out

143-44.

Fred had told him: "Well, it was just Joel and I are in

this partnership together and he turned and just waved, you know,

at 22 & 83-84.

He did, however, treat the business account as

personal money because he could not get any direction from Fred's
estate.

Id. at 26.

Joel had his father fax Fred's executor a

copy of the Offer to Purchase and Affidavit indicating Joel's
interest in the property.

Id. at 28 & 104.

Joel did not,

however, hear anything from the executor for over a year when the
executor instructed him to "hold tight" and carry on as before
Fred's death.

Id. at 27 & 79.

The heir's and the executor knew

that Joel was managing the cattle, but never provided him any
guidance, offered any compensation, or complained.

Id. at 90,

165 8c 170.
In 1994, Joel purchased a five-acre parcel adjoining the
property ("the corner parcel") from Weber County for $1,500.3
Id. at 67. Although he was alreaidy involved in a dispute with
the heirs over his rights, he believed that if the property was a
partnership asset, this corner parcel would provide better
access.

Id. at 65.

parcel was his.

Id.

If not, then he believed that the corner

and no agreement with the heirs was forthcoming.
80.

Id. at 73 & 79-

Joel also acknowledged in the cattle sale contract that Fred

might hold an equitable interest in the cattle as a result of
their partnership before Fred's death.

R. 282, p. 86; Agreement

of Purchase and Sale, 1(4, Exhibit 2 8 (Addendum B ) .
Joel recognized that there were delays in winding up the
partnership, but he attributed these delays to Fred's executor's
refusal to acknowledge the existence of the partnership.
62.

Id. at

From the inception of the partnership until the time of

trial, Joel calculated that the fair value of his work, less
$5,000-10,000 for personal use, came to approximately $101,000.
Id. at 70-72.

Joel's calculation of $101,000 for his

contribution to the partnership included taking care of the
cattle, negotiating for the property, bartering, trading with
other people, reducing the taxes and miscellaneous contributions
to the partnership.

Id. at 98.

His estimates were supported by

third-party testimony concerning reasonable compensation for his
workload given by an experienced dairyman.

Id. at 123 & 128-3 0.

The heirs presented no contrary testimony.
Despite all Joel's efforts, the heirs denied that any
partnership was formed and denied that Joel was entitled to any
compensation for his labor.

R. 141, 145-151; R. 282, pp. 186-88.

Joel, therefore, filed a Notice of Interest on the property, but
the executor transferred the property to the heirs through a
Personal Representative's Deed.

R. 117.
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When Joel and the heirs

were unable to resolve issues of ownership of the cattle and
land, this lawsuit followed.
At trial, Joel argued that a partnership existed which
included the cattle and the property.
186-88.

R. 113-124; R. 282, pp.

Joel argued in the alternative that: (1) his pre-

dissolution labor was compensable based upon the partnership
understanding; (2) his labor was his capital contribution; (3)
Fred gave Joel part of his capital contribution as a gift4; and
(4) or if no partnership was found, that Joel should be
compensated for his labor in quantum meruit.

R. 121-23.

The

heirs argued that no partnership existed, the property was not a
partnership asset, and that they were entitled to a return of
Fred's capital contribution which consisted of the amounts paid
for cattle, land, property taxes, and expenses.
282, p 194.

R. 152-154; R.

(Appellant's Br. at 12).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This Court should affirm the decision of the trial court on
all issues appealed by the heirs/appellants.

Undisputed material

facts demonstrate that the cattle and ranching business
established by Fred and Joel was a partnership which included

4

Appellants cite argument in their own memorandum for the
alleged "fact" that Joel presented no evidence that any portion
of Fred's capital contribution was a gift. Appellant's Br. at
12 (citing R. 185). Their legal argument is not a fact.
Further, it is for the court to determine whether testimony
presented at trial constitutes "fact" supporting a particular
legal theory.
250X22885 1
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both land and cattle, and that half of Fred's capital
contribution to the partnership was a gift to Joel.
The trial court's decision on the existence of partnership
is supported by substantial evidence concerning Fred's and Joel's
intentions and conduct.

The partnership was premised on the

reality that each partner possessed an essential resource that
the other entirely lacked.

Fred could provide only money and

wisdom, while Joel could add labor and management, barter for
services, negotiate contracts, and physically oversee their
cattle operation.

To make their partnership succeed under these

restrictions, Fred explained and implicitly promised to Joel that
all their partnership purposes, Joel's labor would be equal to
Fred's money.

Under this premise, Fred infused into the

partnership sufficient funds to purchase the property and cattle,
while Joel committed uncompensated labor which he estimated to
valued at over $100,000.
While their informal partnership did not conform to standard
commercial practices for recordkeeping, tax allocation, and
titling, the parties executed these responsibilities without
complaint and in a manner that served their business purposes.
They agreed to title all the cattle in Joel's name, and the
property in Fred's name to avoid problems with creditors.
The trial court correctly determined that the property was a
partnership asset because Fred and Joel intended to acquire the
property for partnership purposes and they devoted it exclusively
to partnership use.
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Single-handedly and without compensation,

Joel selected the property, negotiated an affordable price, and
decreased the property taxes. Although Fred financed the
property's purchase, he never saw it until a year afterwards.
Although Fred and Joel ultimately titled the property in
Fred's name for creditor protection, they fully intended that the
property belong to the partnership.

Fred verified this intent in

a sworn affidavit sent to the property's seller.
The court also correctly concluded that because of Fred's
death, the partnership should be dissolved and woundup by selling
the land and cattle and dividing the proceeds equally between the
parties, Joel, as Fred's partner, and Fred's heirs.

The trial

court concluded that the heirs were not entitled to a return of
Fred's capital contribution because "clear and convincing"
evidence demonstrated Fred had given one-half (1/2) of his
capital contribution to Joel.
In its gift determination, the trial court relied upon a
totality of the evidence and the credibility and candor of Joel
to find the elements of donative intent, delivery and acceptance.
Donative intent was supported by Fred and Joel's family
relationship and their close friendship.

Substantial evidence

supported the finding that Fred had no intent that upon his death
Joel would not be entitled to any partnership asset because of a
lack of capital contribution.

Fred's words and conduct

demonstrated his intent to contribute to Joel personally as
opposed to merely investing in a business.

Facts material to

acceptance and delivery are colored by the reality that Fred only
250\22885 1
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intended to give Joel one-half (1/2) of the money he contributed
and he intended to remain a one-half (1/2) owner of assets
purchased with that money.

Thus, the conduct of Fred and Joel,

fully acting as co-owners of the property and cattle, was
consistent with the gift theory adopted by the trial court.
If this Court should reverse the gift determination, there
exists alternative grounds on which to affirm the trial court's
conclusions on winding-up, which grounds include promissory
estoppel or an agreement contrary to the statutory priority
accorded capital contribution.

This Court could agree with

precedent that an oral partnership agreement equating one's labor
with another's money justifies equal division of all assets on
distribution without regard to capital contribution.
Finally, this Court could find that the trial court erred in
concluding that Joel's labor was not a capital contribution under
the unique and limited circumstances of this case.

Even if labor

is generally not a capital contribution, where there exists an
expressed or implied agreement that "sweat equity" by the
laboring partner equals "dollar equity" of the financing partner,
that agreement converts labor into a capital contribution for
purposes of partnership dissolution.
Because appellants failed to meet their burden on appeal to
overturn the trial court's decisions, this Court should promptly
affirm the decision below.

250X22885 1
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ARGUMENT
The heirs have appealed the trial court's decision
challenging determinations that a partnership existed between
Fred and his grand nephew Joel, that the partnership included
property used for the ranch, and that half of Fred's capital
contribution was a gift to Joel.

Because these issues are

interrelated and fact-sensitive, this Court should be aware of
certain findings and comments that the trial court considered
critical to all three issues.
The trial court described Joel as a candid witness who did
not stretch the facts during his testimony.

R. 283, p. 13. This

observation on credibility is critical because Joel was called as
a witness by his opponents, his testimony was uncontroverted, and
he testified heavily, without objection, about his past
conversations with his deceased grand-uncle Fred.
In assessing testimony that is uncontroverted because
certain central parties were no longer alive at the time of
trial, the trial court nevertheless will determine whether
testimony concerning the deceased was "self-serving and not
believable in view of the witness's conduct, demeanor and
substantive testimony during trial."

Homer v Smith, 866 P.2d

622, 627 (Utah App. 1993) . An appellate court defers to the fact
finder who is "in the best position to judge the credibility of
witnesses and is free to disbelieve their testimony."
trial court believed Joel.

250X22885 1
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.Id. The

The trial court also found that Fred was a capable,
coherent, and astute elderly gentleman who was not a person that
Joel could take advantage of.

R. 253.

It declared the

"father/son" relationship between Fred and Joel to be pivotal to
its decision.

R. 253.

It also considered Fred's estranged

relationship with his heirs to be critical in analyzing the very
issues raised in this appeal.

R. 282, pg. 201-02.
POINT I

THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION THAT
FRED'S AND JOEL'S BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP WAS A PARTNERSHIP.
A.

This Court should review with deference the trial
court's decision that a partnership existed.

In reviewing a determination about the existence of a
partnership, an appellate court "is obliged to view the evidence
and all inferences that may be drawn therefrom in a light most
supportive of the findings of the trier of fact.

The findings

and judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed when they
are based on substantial, competent, admissible evidence."
Nupetco Assoc, v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 881 (Utah 1983); Cutler
v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349, 1350-51 (Utah 1975),
partnership existence as finding of fact).

(affirming

"On conflicting

evidence, the question of whether a partnership exists is one for
the trier of fact."

Murphy v Stevens, 645 P.2d 82, 85 (Wyo.

1982) (finding oral agreement constituted partnership).

"Persons

who intend to do the things that constitute a partnership are
partners whether their express purpose was to create or avoid the
relationship."
250\22885 1
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Even if this Court reviews the issue of partnership
existence as a mixed question of law and fact, the trial court's
decision should be reviewed with "broad discretion."
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994).

State v.

Substantial deference to

the trial court is appropriate because (1) the facts to which
these legal rules would be applied are "so complex and varying"
that no rule could adequately address their relevance; (2)
appellate judges have not definitively determined outcome
determinative factors; and (3) the trial judge observed
witnesses' demeanor and appearance which cannot be sufficiently
reflected on the record.

Id. at 939.

These factors dictate that

the trial court had discretion "to reach one of several possible
conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set of facts
without risking reversal."
B.

Id. at 937.

The facts more than adequately demonstrate that the
business relationship was a partnership.

The trial court found that Fred's and Joel's cattle and
ranch business constituted a partnership in which both partners
actively participated from the inception of the partnership
arrangement.

R. 253-254.

The Utah Code defines partnership as

"an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit."

Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3 (1998).

"The

requisites of a partnership are that the parties must have joined
together to carry on a trade or adventure for their common
benefit, each contributing property or services, and having a

250V22885 1
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community of interest in the profits."

Bentley v. Brossard, 94

P.736, 741 (Utah 1908) .
1. Joel and Fred intended to create a partnership and
carried on as co-owners in their business.
"Whether the parties were partners depends on their
intentions and conduct."

Holmes v. Holmes, 849 P.2d 1140, 1143

(Or. App.) (affirming finding of partnership); adhered to as
modified, 855 P.2d 1164 (Or. App.); rev, denied, 862 P.2d 1305
(Or. 1993).

"When there is no written agreement, the court looks

primarily to the parties' conduct and course of dealing to
determine whether a partnership existed."

Id.

The trial court found that it was Fred's intent that Joel
would be his 50/50 partner.

R. 255.

Fred and Joel acted as co-

owners in that they actively participated in the partnership,
contacted each other on a regular basis, and each kept apprised
of their business.

R. 253.

The trial court also found Joel's and Fred's statements to
third parties consistent with their intent that their business
relationship was a partnership.

R. 254.

Joel eventually sold

the cattle after Fred's death through a contract acknowledging
the potential interest of Fred's estate because of the
partnership.
(Addendum B ) .

Agreement of Purchase and Sale #4, Exhibit 2 8
Fred described his relationship with Joel to a

neighbor as a partnership relationship.

R. 254.

He swore in an

affidavit to the railroad that property he was financing was
being purchased by a "partnership" with Joel.

250\22885 1
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R. 254.

2. The contributions of Fred and Joel to the business
enterprise indicate that their relationship was a partnership.
"One of the primary matters to consider in determining
whether a partnership exists is the nature of the contribution
each party makes to the enterprise."
1349, 1351 (Utah 1975)

Cutler v Bowen, 543 P.2d

"It need not be in the form of tangible

assets or capital, but, as is frequently done, one partner may
make such a contribution, and this may be balanced by the other's
performance of services and the shouldering of responsibility."
Id.
The trial court found that both Fred and Joel actively
contributed to the partnership.

R. 253.

They acted consistently

with their repeatedly expressed premise that Fred would supply
the funding and wisdom while Joel contributed energy, labor, and
legwork.

R. 282, pp. 85, 148, 73-74, 96.

Based upon this

premise, Fred infused money to purchase land and cattle without
any provision for repayment while Joel committed uncompensated
labor which he estimated to be valued at over $100,000.

Id. at

14, 20, 153, 70-72.
3. Fred and Joel had a common interest in the profits of
their partnership.
Fred and Joel expressed common interests in both the short
term and long term profits of their business.

Their business

plan was to reinvest any profits and "try to build or establish
something big."

Id. at 149.

profit making goal:

250X22885 1
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"And like me and Fred talked, we always
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figured we would never let the place go until it was worth over a
million dollars, you know."

Id. at 155.

4. The conduct of Fred and Joel regarding partnership
records/ taxes, and titling of property was consistent with their
own purposefully individualized business plan.
Although the recordkeeping for the partnership did not
conform to model commercial partnership-business practices, the
trial court was persuaded that their informal approach to
business matters was consistent with partnership.

R. 254. The

trial court found that the responsibility to keep partnership
records fell equally on both of them.

R. 256.

But, Fred and

Joel's trust in each other made record keeping unnecessary.
282, P. 21-22.

Fred never asked for an account of Joel's labor

nor an account of his expenditures of Fred's money.
105.

R.

Id. at 87,

In fact, Fred expressed an aversion to help from business

professionals.

Id. at 102.

Contrary to the heirs' contention in their appeal,
Appellant's Br. at 17-18, the above-described actions

Fred and

Joel clearly distinguish the instant case from Johanson Bros, v.
Industrial Comm'n., 118 Utah 384, 222 P.2d 563, 567 (1950) as to
the elements of partnership that court deemed material.

In

Johanson, some of the workmen did not even know they were
partners; they had no rights in management or control; they had
no ownership in any business equipment; only the employer could
contract for jobs; they were not consulted on methods of
operation or the identity of copartners or results to be
accomplished; and there was no settling of affairs when an
250\22885 1
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employee was released.

Id. at 567.

Thus, the Johanson decision

provides no support for the heirs' appeal of the trial court's
decision finding partnership.
C•

If this Court should reverse the trial court's decision
recognizing a partnership, then it should award Joel
compensation for his services through quantum meruit.

If this Court should reverse the trial court's decision on
partnership, Joel should be compensated fairly for all his
efforts through the theory of Quantum Meruit.

Under that theory,

Joel could receive the value of his services if (1) Fred received
a benefit from Joel's labors; (2) Fred knew of or appreciated
that benefit; and (3) circumstances would make it unjust for Fred
to retain the benefit without paying for it.
Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah App. 1987).

See Davies v.
Contrary to

Appellant's contention, recovery in quantum meruit would not
contravene Utah partnership law, denying compensation for
partner's services to a partnership, because Joel's claim under
quantum meruit arises only if the trial court's decision finding
partnership is reversed.
This Court, however, should never have to reach the issue of
recovery under Quantum Meruit because evidence of a partnership
was compelling.

During the bench trial, even counsel for the

heirs admitted the existence of partnership, stating in closing
argument, "We believe there is a partnership here. . . We don't
dispute that."

R. 282, p.188.

Instead, it was only "the extent

of the partnership" that the heirs actually considered at issue.

250N22885 1
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POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION THAT THE
PROPERTY PURCHASED BY FRED WAS A PARTNERSHIP ASSET.
Approximately a year after the creation of their cattle
partnership, Fred and Joel purchased the property, a thousand
acres in Weber County that the trial court found was a
partnership asset.

R. 254, 257-58.

According to state statute,

"All property originally brought into the partnership's stock or
subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise on account of the
partnership is partnership property."

Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-5

(1998) . A partnership agreement to hold and use land as a
partnership asset need not be in writing.

An oral agreement is

valid and may be enforced between the parties.
Gentry, 144 P.2d 38, 43 (Ca. 1943).

Swarthout v

Thus, the trial court's

finding that the property was a partnership asset should be
affirmed.
A.

This Court should defer to the trial courts decision
that the property was a partnership asset.

Whether a particular asset belongs to a partnership
enterprise is a finding of fact.

See Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d

1349, 1352 (Utah 1975) (affirming good will as partnership
asset).

More particularly, in reviewing a trial court's decision

as to whether a particular piece of real property titled in one
partner's name is actually partnership property, the Supreme
Court of Utah declared:
[W]e do not disturb his findings and judgment
merely because we might have viewed the
matter differently, but would do so only if
250X22885 1
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it appeared that the evidence clearly
preponderates against them, or that he has so
abused his discretion or misapplied the law,
that an injustice has resulted.
Corbet v Corbet, 472 P.2d 430, 432-33 (Utah, 1970); see also
Dotson v Grice, 647 P.2d 409, 411 (N.M. 1982) (whether real
property is partnership asset remains question of fact even when
the partners have not changed record title into the partnership);
Lutz v Schmillen, 899 P.2d 861, 864 (Wyo. 1995) (appellate court
should refuse to set aside findings about whether real property
is partnership asset unless they are clearly erroneous and leave
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed).5
B.

The facts indicating "partnership asset" clearly
overcome any alleged presumption of individual
ownership created by title.

The heirs, as appellants, argue that there exists a
presumption that ownership of real property vests in the
individual titleholder, not the partnership.
19-20.

Appellant's Br. at

They note that the intent of the parties controls the

issue and cite cases from foreign jurisdictions in alleging that
overcoming this presumption requires clear and convincing
evidence of intent to include real property as a partnership
asset.6

Id.

Their Brief cites a Colorado decision for the

5

As noted in Section A of Point I, if this Court
determines that the partnerships asset issue is a mixed question
of fact and law, nevertheless, the trial court's decision should
be reviewed with "broad discretion."
6

Whether this presumption exists in Utah and the burden of
proof to overcome the presumption is uncertain.
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factors indicative of intent.
notes:

Id.

Significantly, that decision

"The intent of the parties with respect to the issue of

contribution of the property is a question of fact which is
binding upon appeal unless there is no competent evidence to
support that finding.
1091,

See Standring v. Standring, 794 P.2d 1089,

(Colo. App. 1990).

Utah courts not only consider intent

as a question of fact, Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104,
108 (Utah 1991), but, also consider that "it rests primarily with
the trial court to determine whether the evidence was clear and
convincing.

Lovett v. Continental Bank and Trust Co., 286 P.2d

1065, 1068 (Utah 1955) .
The trial court in this case not only found that the
partnership purchased the property, but also that both Fred and
Joel desired to obtain the property for the partnership.

R. 254.

Although the trial court did not use the words "clear and
convincing" it stated: "There is no question in my mind, and I
find as fact, that the intent of Fred was that this property and
the cows be considered as part of the partnership between the
parties."

R. 282, p. 189.

The interrelationship between the presumption that
"ownership vests with a titled party" and "partnership property"
has been explained as follows:

Whereas purchasers and creditors

"have the right to rely on the title to the real estate as shown
by the record," as between the parties, the controlling factor to
determine whether real property belongs to a partnership is the
parties' intent.

In Re Pearies Estate, 192 P.2d 532, 536 (Mont.

1948) (implying agreement that real estate is firm asset from
parties' conduct, circumstances attending the land transaction,
and treating the real estate as partnership property.)

See also,

Swarthout v Gentry, 144 P.2d 38, 44 (Ca. 1943) (finding land not
purchased with partnership funds to be partnership property
because titled partner contributed land as firm asset);

Lutz v

Schmillen, 899 P.2d 861, 864 (Wyo. 1995) (declaring ranch to be
partnership asset despite one party's acquiring financing and
title because of conduct, property's use, and purpose of
acquisition to devote the property to partnership purposes).
C.

Fred and Joel intended the scope of their ranching
partnership to encompass both cattle and land/ and they
used the property for partnership purposes.

[T]he chief criterion to determine whether property belongs
to a partnership is "the intent of the partners to devote it to
partnership purposes."
(Ca. App. 1947).

Zanetti v. Zanetti, 175 P.2d 603, 606

Thus by finding that it was Fred's desire that

the property be held by the partnership and used for the cattle
ranching business, the trial court correctly determined that the
property was a partnership asset.

R. 255.

Fred's and Joel's acquisition and use of the property was
entirely for the partnership purposes of cattle ranching.
282, P. 161.

R.

Each in their own way contributed to remodeling and

cleanups for this purpose.

Id. at 38, 161-62.

Furthermore,

both Joel and Fred intended that their ultimate partnership
profit would occur when the property was sold.

Joel believed,

and it was Fred's own experience, that an eventual sale for
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subdivision purposes was the only way a cattle ranching operation
ever actually succeeded.

R. 282, p.8.

They, therefore intended

to hold on to the property until they could sell it for a million
dollars. "

Id^. at 155.

Joel's uncompensated efforts relating to the property only
make sense if the property was a partnership asset.

A partner

donating considerable time to an alleged partnership asset
without compensation, indicates that the partnership includes
that alleged asset.
(Utah 1927).

See Kimball v McCornick, 259 P. 313, 316

Single-handedly and without any remuneration, Joel

selected the property, negotiated its purchase and price, and
decreased taxes.

R. 282, pp. 35, 153, 91-92, 159-60.

He alone

made acquisition of the property an affordable reality for the
partnership and a useable asset.
entirely upon Joel.

Id. at 35, 154.

Fred relied

In fact, Fred did not even see the property

until a year after its purchase. Id. at 162-63.
At the critical time during the purchasing process, Joel
permitted Fred to determine whether the partnership or Fred
individually would be "purchaser" of the property.
92.

Id. at 33-36,

Fred swore to the third-party sellers in an affidavit that

the purchaser was the partnership.

See Affidavit, Exhibit C to

Offer to Purchase Real Property, Exhibit 3 0 (Addendum A ) .
Although Fred made later business judgments about titling, this
affidavit is the only document wherein he gives his oath to
truthfully setting forth his intent as to ownership of the
property.
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D.

Fred and Joel did not intend their business decision to
title the property in Fred's name to change the status
of the property from a partnership asset.

In the process of purchasing the property, Fred and Joel
initially signed an Offer to Purchase describing their
partnership as purchaser of the property.

Id.

agreed to title the property in Fred's name.

Later, they
R. 282, P. 37, 94.

The trial court found that this decision conformed to
personal business needs and was not intended to change the
property from a partnership asset.

R. 254-55.

This decision,

made without assistance of lawyers, was intended for creditor
protection:

the cattle were titled in Joel's name, and the

property in Fred's.

Id. at 255.

The trial court noted:

"I

think [Fred] was doing what many men want to do without a lawyer,
looking at a young man and saying if he gets into trouble I don't
want it to come back against the property."

R. 2 82, p. 18 9.

Similarly, in Holmes, 849 P,2d at 1143, the title to certain
Oregon ranch property was transferred to the father individually
to accomplish the partners' business purpose of lessening the
partnership's over-all expenses.

The Holmes court found the

ranch remained a partnership asset.

Id.

Despite Fred's and

Joel's business decision judgment about titling, this Court
should affirm the trial court's decision that the property was a
partnership asset.
Finally, contrary to the heirs' contentions in their Brief,
Appellant's Br. at 23, Frandsen v. Holladav, 739 P.2d 1111 (Utah
App. 1987), provides no support for a reversal of the trial
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court's finding that the property was partnership property.
Notably, the Frandsen court, without detailing any facts, upheld
the trial court's "ultimate finding" about the partnership asset
issue as supported by "substantial, competent evidence on the
record."

Id. at 1113.

It noted that the trial court had (1)

obviously recognized that the deed title was "not conclusive on
the issue of whether the land was or was not partnership property
for purposes of [Utah Code Ann.] section 48-1-22;" and (2)
instead examined the conduct of the parties to determine their
intent.

Id.

Thus, the Frandsen decision merely supports an

appellate court's upholding a trial court's decision and provides
no factual analogy supportive of this Court's reversing the trial
court.
E. If this Court reverses the trial court's decision
finding that the property was a partnership asset, then it should
also reverse its finding that the corner parcel was partnership
property.
If this Court reverses either the trial court's decision
finding a partnership or its determination that the property is a
partnership asset, it should also reverse the trial court's
determination that the corner parcel, a five-acre parcel of land
in Weber County that Joel purchased in 1994, was partnership
property.

R. 258.

Joel purchased the corner parcel with his own

funds and intended it to be part of his contribution to a landand-cattle partnership.

R. 257-58.

The corner parcel was

purchased to provide improved access to existing partnership
property and to increase the value of the entire partnership
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property.

R. 282, pp. 65-66.

When Joel purchased the corner

parcel, however, he was already involved in a controvei~sy with
the heirs.

He believed that " [i]f it was not a partnership,

then that ground was mine."

Id. at 65.

As discussed previously, a decision that real property,
financed by and titled in one pairtner, is a partnership asset
depends largely upon intent and the purpose of acquisition to
devote the property to partnership purposes.
864.

Lutz, 8 99 P.2d at

All of the partnership purposes for which Joel intended the

purchase the corner parcel are defeated if the property is not
first declared partnership property.

Setting aside the findings

and conclusion declaring the corner parcel as a partnership asset
would be appropriate because a reversal negating the property's
status as a partnership asset would create a "definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed."

Id.

Therefore,

if "partnership" including the property does not exist, then the
corner parcel should be declared Joel's property.
Nevertheless, the overwhelming evidence demonstrates that
this Court should not have to reaich this sub-issue because
substantial evidence supports affirming the trial court's
decision declaring a partnership including land and cattle.
POINT1 III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT ONE-HALF OF FRED'S
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE PARTNERSHIP WAS A GIFT TO JOEL,
This Court should affirm the trial court's decision finding
one-half of Fred's capital contribution to be a gift to Joel and
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implicitly denying the heirs' demand for a return of the entire
capital contribution.7

The trial court found clear and

convincing evidence that the "contributions of cash to the
partnership were 50/50.
Fred as a gift to Joel."8

The 50% for Joel being contributed by
R. 255, 258.

In reviewing this decision, this Court should be aware that
in the context of gift, "it rests primarily with the trial court
to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing."
Lovett v. Continental Bank & Trust Co.. 286 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah
1955).

Undisputed collateral evidence is sufficient to prove

"gift" at the clear and convincing standard.

Id.

For purposes

of appellate review of this issue, "the test of the sufficiency

7

The heirs have requested that this Court remand this
case with instructions to award them "the property at issue,
including the real property." Appellants' Br. at 34-35.
However, as a matter of clarification, Fred's actual capital
contribution was money, not land or cattle. All conversations
about their partnership stated that while Joel would provide
labor, Fred would provide start-up money. R. 1-2; R. 2 82, pp.
13-14. Nowhere in the transcript is Fred described as an
independent cattle owner or landowner who would, or did,
contribute these personal assets to a partnership. Thus even if
this Court reverses the trial court on the "gift" issue, the
heirs are not entitled to the property.
8

Appellants were misleading in stating that the "gift"
issue was only superficially raised. Appellant's Br. at 25 n.3.
The gift theory was clearly set forth in Joel's Trial Brief.
R. 123-24. At trial, based upon the trial court's having
thoroughly reviewed the Trial Briefs, counsel for both parties
elected to forego opening arguments. R. 282, pp. 3, 185.
Closing arguments were only to supplement the Briefs. Id. at
185, 186. Thus, the trial was conducted with minimal legal oral
argument. Counsel left it to the trial court to evaluate
testimony in terms of proffered legal theories, including
"gift."
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of the evidence is "whether the evidence is reasonably
sufficient."

Id.

The trial court determined that the burden to prove "gift"
was satisfied through the totality of the evidence and Joel's
credibility and candid testimony.

During the hearing on Motion

to Reconsider the trial court stated, "I heard throughout the
whole trial without the use of the word gift that [the capital
contribution] was a gift."

R. 283, p. 13.

In assessing Joel's

testimony in terms of the gift issue, the trial court noted, "He
could obviously have stretched it.
candid in his testimony."

I thought he was extremely

R. 283, p. 13.

This Court

consistently defers to trial court decisions based upon these
grounds because an appellate court cannot garner a sense of the
proceeding as a whole from the cold record.

Poulsen v. Frear,

946 P.2d 738 (Utah App. 1997).
A.

Fred intended that 50% of anything that he contributed
to the partnership belong to Joel.

To find an intervivos gift, a trial court must find clear
and convincing evidence of the donor's intent, delivery, and
acceptance.
1981).

Estate of Ross v. Ross, 626 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah

In assessing Fred's intent, it is important to revisit

the trial court's findings about his character.

Fred was fully

aware of what he was doing and was conscious of the reality that
his life expectancy was limited.

R. 253, 256.

For purposes of proving gift, Joel's family relationship
with Fred is significant.
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1965) (trial court may rely on "the fact that it is natural to
make a gift to a member of one's family.")

Joel and Fred had a

"clear family relationship" that was as close as a father/son
relationship.

R. 255-56, 253.

By contrast, Fred's relationship

with his heirs was estranged and lacked any contact.

R. 253.

Fred and Joel's close friendship can also become a factor in
finding clear and convincing evidence of gift.

Sims v. George,

466 P.2d 831, 833 (Utah 1970) (validating gift of stocks from
elderly gentleman to long-term friend).

Friendship constituted a

reasonable basis for believing that "there were reasons best
known to [the elderly gentleman] himself why because of the longtime special friendship he wanted to have the privilege of giving
part of his property to the defendant instead of keeping it all
until his death."

Id.

Similarly, the trial court found, "Joel's

cash contribution was given to Joel by Fred as Joel was one of
the only individuals Fred had a great caring for."

R. 255-56.

The evidence supports the trial court's finding that Fred
had "no intent that upon his death, Joel would not be entitled to
any of the partnership assets because of a lack of capital
contribution."

R. 256.

"Fred had no intention that his money

that was given to Joel would in some way come back to him other
than a . . . 50/50 relationship."

R. 283 pg. 13.

These findings

are logical inferences from Fred's conduct and statements such
as, "If you can put together a good enough deal, we got the
money,"

R. 282, p. 154. (emphasis added), and his assuring Joel

that Joel need not worry about Fred's heirs taking away Joel's
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ownership interest in the property because Fred's heirs had no
interest in him or his property.

Id. at 55-56.

These findings are also consistent with Joel's and Fred's
partnership premise that each would give the best of what they
had.

R. 1-2; R. 282, pp. 13-14.

contributed "the value of me."

Joel believed that he
R. 282, p. 73-74.

In reality,

Joel and Fred each gave to the other in a manner more like "The
Gift of the Maji" than a business transaction.
As Joel testified, the partnership's buying land was not a
condition of his continuing to provide labor and Fred providing
the money.

Id. at 182.

Instead, as Joel testified, the

relationship with Joel had a much deeper meaning to Fred
And I felt bad for him sitting up there in
that chair and not anybody, anyone call him
or do anything for him. It gave him life. I
mean it gave him something to wake up in the
morning for. And, yea, this is what we can
do. He could think about things, plan things
out. It gave him, you know, thoughts again.
Id. at 183.
Clearly, neither Fred nor Joel operated on the expectation
that during their partnership either one's contribution should
receive preferential status.

Unfortunately, they did not foresee

that, upon dissolution after Fred's death, Fred's heirs would
insist on preferential treatment for Fred's contributions in a
manner that would enrich them at Joel's expense.

This result is

contrary to any testimony from which Fred's intent might be

inferred.
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Furthermore, contrary to Appellant's contention, the facts
demonstrate that Fred intended to contribute to Joel personally
as opposed to investing in a business.

Initially it was Fred who

provided the impetus behind Joel's seriously exploring career
options.

Fred committed himself to enhancing Joel's future by

offering him advice and money to establish any career.
R. 283 pg. 14.

R. 253,

Once the cattle operation began, Fred desired to

obtain land because he "desired to continue to assist his
grandnephew Joel in business."

R. 254.

All of the testimony

indicated that Fred's primary concern was Joel.
Thus, the facts clearly and convincingly demonstrate Fred's
intent to execute an intervivos gift to Joel of one-half of the
capital he contributed to the partnership.
B.

Assessing the elements of "delivery" and "acceptance"
requires a recognition that Fred # s giving Joel only
one-half of the purchase price permitted him to
complete delivery of this gift while retaining egual
control over the assets purchased.

For purposes of analyzing delivery and acceptance, Fred's
gift to Joel of only a one-half interest in his capital
contribut ion distinguishes this case from decisions where a donor
allegedly relinquished 100% ownership.

Fred intended to remain

an equal one-half owner of any assets purchased with his retained
half of his capital contribution monies.
In the cases cited in Brief by the heirs/Appellants,
Appellants' Br. at 31-32, because the donor allegedly gave up
full ownership, delivery required irrevocable parting of title
and control so complete that use without permission would

constitute trespassing.
Ct. App. 1988).

Hopping v. Wood, 526 N.E.2d 1205 (Ind.

Utah courts, however, recognize that delivery

can only be as complete "as the nature of the thing will admit
of."

Ross, 626 P.2d at 492.

It would, therefore, be

inappropriate to require that Fred, as a half-owner of purchased
assets be treated like a trespasser if he makes use of the cattle
or property he shares.
Fred's gift of only a one-half interest in the money for
purchase of the cattle and the property also dictated the manner
of the gift's delivery and acceptance.

Fred sent money and

purchased cattle which he had delivered to Joel who accepted sole
possession of the cattle titled in his name only.
sold the cattle without accounting to Fred.
88.

R. 254. Joel

R. 282, pp. 21, 87-

After the property was purchased, Joel accepted it as his

shared estate.

Id.

He did not feel the need to consult Fred on

decisions regarding the property's use.

Id. at 162.

he dreamed of building a home on the property.

Like Fred,

Id. at 100-01.

Like Fred, he dreamed of becoming rich when the property was
eventually sold for a million dollars.

Id. at 155.

Fred and

Joel's purposeful business decisions as to title, tax returns and
property taxes dispel any inferences contrary to "gift."

See

supra. Point II, Section D.
Thus, the trial court correctly determined that Fred's
completed gifts to Joel equalized their capital contributions for
purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-37 (1998).

This court should

therefore affirm the trial court's conclusions that (1) Joel and
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the heirs are each entitled to one-half of the partnership assets
and (2) the property and cattle should be sold and the net
proceeds equally divided between the heirs and Joel.9

R. 258.

POINT IV
EVEN IF THIS COURT REVERSES THE GIFT DECISION IT CAN AFFIRM
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION ON WINDING UP THE PARTNERSHIP
ON ALTERNATIVE THEORIES.
If this Court should reverse the trial court's decision that
half of Fred's capital contribution was a gift to Joel, then it
may affirm on several alternative theories.

An appellate court

may affirm on any theory supportable on the record, even if that
theory differs from the one stated by the trial court and "'even
though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by
appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not
considered or passed on by the lower court.'"

Goodsel v. Dept.

of Bus. Reg., 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1974) (citation omitted);
State v. Montova, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah App. 1997) .
A.

Promissory estoppel provides an alternative basis for
declaring that within this partnership labor and
capital should be treated equally for purposes of
distribution between partners.

The doctrine of promissory estoppel requires proof that
plaintiff acted in reasonable reliance on defendant's promise,
defendant knew plaintiff relied on the promise which should
reasonably induce action or forbearance, defendant was aware of
the facts, and plaintiff's reliance resulted in plaintiff's loss.

9

The trial court also decided that Joel's wind-up labor was
approximately equal to the heirs' tax payments. R. 258.
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See Skanchv v. Calcados Orthope SA. 952 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Utah
1998).

Each of these elements can be found in the facts of this

case.
Fred's and Joel's threshold agreement that they would build
a business out of Fred's money and Joel's labor is essentially a
promise by Fred that, for all business purposes, Joel's labor
would be treated equally with his money.
73-74.

R. 282, pp. 148, 85,

Fred also promised to advise Joel with his wisdom.

at 148, 21-22.

Id.

When Joel became nervous that their partnership

relationship was not adequately formalized, Fred assured him that
accurate record keeping was unnecessary.

Id. at 21-22.

Fred

dissuaded Joel from seeking professional business advice with
horror stories about lawyers.

Id. at 102.

Specifically, Fred

persuaded Joel that he need not worry about protecting his
ownership interest in the property after Fred's death:

Joel had

expressed the concern that "[t]he first thing that would happen
is your kids would come and take everything I got."
56.

Id., at 55-

Fred responded:
He looked at me and said, "Joel, don't worry
about that." He goes, "if you died tomorrow,
I would be in a hell of a mess. And he says,
not only that, you are the only one that I
see, ever talks to me. My kids they all have
successful jobs. There [sic] all doing their
own thing. There [sic] not even going to be
around when I die." He was correct on that
point. When he died, they were not around.

Id.

Thus, Fred promised, and convinced Joel to believe, that

Joel's ownership rights were secure.
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Joel relied on this promise

by continuing to labor for the partnership and forbearing pursuit
of formal, legalized agreements.

And, Fred knew it.

Joel estimated the value of his uncompensated efforts at
$101,000.

Id. at 70-72.

He believed that he was half owner of

an increasing heard of cattle and an appreciating piece of
property.

It would now be an unconscionable detriment to Joel

not to enforce Fred's implicit promise that Joel owned half of
the cattle and the property.

During his life, Fred made no

exceptions to this promise to Joel.

This Court should not

countenance the heirs creating an exception after Fred's death by
according Fred's money protected status as a capital contribution
with priority over Joel's labor contribution.
B.

Joel's and Fred's partnership understanding constituted
an exception to the statutory priority accorded capital
contributions in settling accounts between partners
after dissolution,

Fred and Joel expressly created a partnership understanding
that was broad enough to override statutory provisions otherwise
controlling the distribution of the partnership capital and
assets upon dissolution.

Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-37 (1998), which

sets forth rules for distribution, states:

"In settling accounts

between the partners after dissolution the following rules shall
be observed, subject to any agreement to the contrary."
(emphasis added).

Because there is no requirement that a

contrary agreement be written, this Court may find such agreement
expressly or by implication from the record.
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The record unequivocally demonstrates that the terms of the
partnership agreement were that, for all business purposes,
Joel's labor would be equivalent to Fred's money.
85, 148, 73-74, 96.

R. 2 82, pp.

It is appropriate on appeal to honor the

partners' commitment to each other and to their partnership.
The intended breadth of the partnership understanding, FULLY
equating labor with money, arose out of the partners' respect for
each others' unique and essential personal assets.

Id. at 96.

Both partners accepted the reality that the partnership could not
exist without total interdependence.

Id.

For the partnership to

survive, each partner had to count on the other to contribute
freely whenever needed.

Id. at 45.

Between themselves, Joel and

Fred needed no record keeping to compare their contributions.
Id. at 21-22.

Whatever they gave was immediately equal.

Thus,

the premise of "equal contributions through money or labor"
became more than mere words.

It controlled each partners'

actions and each one's appreciation for the other's contribution.
Fred recognized that Joel's labor was necessary for more
than the daily needs of their partnership.

Without Joel's

efforts to locate property and negotiate an affordable price,
Fred's available funds would be totally insufficient.
91, 152-54.

Id. at 35,

Joel negotiated to reduce the property's price by

almost $200,000 and to reduce taxes by $15,000 per year.

Id. at

91, 153, 159-60.
Joel received no compensation for this effort despite the
tremendous amount of money Fred saved, and Joel's efforts to save
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money increased his own daily work load.

When the cattle moved

to the property, Joel had to work harder to care for them in two
locations and access to the property was inadequate.

Id. at 74,

181.
There is precedent supporting the theory that a partnership
agreement equalizing labor and money justifies equal division of
all assets on dissolution.
App. 1995).

Kuhl v Gardner, 894 P.2d 525 (Or.

In this convoluted dispute, the parties had operated

under the expressed agreement that defendant, a distant
businessman, would put up all the money to purchase low income
rentals properties while plaintiffs, a husband/wife team, would
do all of the work to manage and maintain the rentals.

The

appellate court affirmed: (1) reestablishment of partnership
including real estate titled in defendant's name; and (2) the
order for accounting, dissolution, and equal division of assets
including proceeds of all real estate sales.

Jd. at 526

Analogous to the instant case, plaintiffs in Kuhl had placed
no monetary value on time invested and kept no records (defendant
asked for none).

Id. at 532.

Just as Joel and Fred intended to

reinvest and keep the property until it had substantially
appreciated, the Oregon partnership agreed no profits would be
distributed until dissolution after defendant's retirement in ten
years when the properties would be liquidated.

Id.

Similarly, when defendant argued that the paper record
showed no partnership was ever created, plaintiffs explained that
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all properties were titled in defendants' name as a business
decision.

Id. at 528-30 (plaintiffs had declared bankruptcy).

Ultimately, the trial court, noting the credibility of
plaintiffs, believed the plaintiffs' theory of partnership:

an

agreement that plaintiffs' work equaled defendant's money.

Id.

at 532.

The appellate court affirmed finding that "defendant got

what he bargained for: "local management and servicing of the
numerous properties, leaving him free to engage in his business
1,000 miles away."

Id.

Thus, an oral agreement that one party

provide all services while the other party provided all funds
justifies equal distribution of proceeds of the sale of real
estate without regard for capital contribution.
An appellate court in New Mexico also affirmed the trial
court's decision that the decedent and his partner had entered
into an oral agreement that partnership assets of a ranching
business would be equally divided regardless of their respective
capital contributions.

Citizens Bank of Clovis v. Williams, 630

P.2d 1228 (N.M. 1981) (personal representative of deceased's
estate brought action for partnership accounting).

The partners

were old friends and their partnership was based upon the
deceased partner contributing most of the capital while the
surviving partner did most of the labor.

Id. at 122 9.

The Citizens Bank court noted the statutory provision giving
priority to return of capital contributions absent contrary
agreement.

Id. at 1230.

It also rioted that the terms of a

partnership agreement need not be written or "formally expressed,
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but may be inferred or established, in whole or in part, from the
acts of the parties."

Id. at 1230-31.

"This general principal

applies with equal force to agreements to divide assets upon
dissolution without repayment of capital contributions."

Id. at

1231.
In applying these legal precepts to facts similar to the
instant case, the appellate court stated:
If there was ever a case which called upon the trial
judge to exercise his discretion and apply equitable
powers, it is this one. The record is replete with
testimony that [the deceased wanted [his partner] to be
taken care of; that [the deceased] felt [his partner]
should eventually own the ranch; that [the partner] and
his wife took care of the deceased and the ranch for
many years.
Id. at 1231.

Noting "very imposing arguments" in opposition to

the trial court's decision, the appellate court stated:
However, we feel that as an appellate court, we should
not retry this case. The trial judge hears the
witnesses in person and has the opportunity to observe
their demeanor and manner of testifying and has a much
better grasp of the evidence in its entirety than we
have. Based upon a cold record on appeal and absent an
erroneous application of the law, we will not interfere
with the trial court's decision.
Id.

The same law, the same facts, the same equities, and the

same analysis applies in this case.
Under the same legal principles, a Minnesota court affirmed
a decision that an implied, oral agreement negated the right to
return of capital contribution prior to division of partnership
assets.

Peterson v. Peterson, 169 N.W.2d 228 (Minn. 1969) .

A

surviving partner, the father of a deceased partner, had
contributed capital to a chicken-hatchery partnership primarily
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operated by the son.

Upon his son's death, the father sought

return of his capital, partly because he did not like his son's
wife.

Id. at 22 9.

Based largely on the conduct of the partners,

the father's fondness for his son, and the son's having done most
of the labor in the business, the Peterson court affirmed that it
was "entirely reasonable to infer that [the father] put up the
capital and [the son] provided the labor under an agreement by
which each was to own half of the business, including both
capital and profits."

Id. at 231.

In essence, the trial court in this instant made the same
determination in finding that upon dissolution, Joel was entitled
to half of the cattle ranching partnership, including both
capital and profits.

The evidence so overwhelmingly supports

this determination that, for this Court, it becomes a matter of
determining the appropriate legal handle to support this
equitable result.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT LABOR WAS NOT A
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE.
The trial court erred in its conclusion that "Joel's labor
was not a capital contribution."

R. 258.

This Court need only

reach this issue if it reverses the trial court's decision that
Fred gifted Joel one half of his capital contribution.

Under

those circumstances, the cross-appealed conclusion should be
reviewed de novo as a question of law.

See State v. Richardson,

843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah App. 1992) (n/ [w]e consider the trial
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court's interpretation of binding case law as presenting a
question of law and review the trial court's interpretation of
that law for correctness").
For purposes of this issue there is no marshalling of
contrary evidence.

The trial court noted that its decision came

from reading the case law cited in the parties' Trial Briefs.
282, p. 204-05.

R.

The trial court noted that a majority of the

cited cases weighed against labor being a capital contribution.
Id.
Joel has cross-appealed based upon his contention that the
trial court should have recognized that the partnership
agreement, along with the partners' intent and actions, created a
limited, well-defined exception to the rule.

First Fred and Joel

agreed that Joel would contribute all the labor while Fred
contributed all the money for their partnership.
96, 148.

R. 73-74, 85,

The entire testimony demonstrates that, in conformance

with this agreement, the partners conducted themselves as if
Joel's labor equaled Fred's money for all business purposes.
Therefore, any protected status that Fred's money achieved as a
capital contribution should also be accorded to Joel's labor.
Utah courts have determined that in partnerships where one
partner contributes labor and the other money, the value of the
working partner's services can be declared his capital
contributions to the partnership.
P.2d 122, 126 (Utah 1958).

See Eardley v. Sammons, 330

The Court recognized that it was

reasonable for the laboring partner to expect compensation for
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his services.

However, upon dissolution, in the absence of a

specific agreement about salaries, the court declared that the
contribution of the partner risking money and the other risking
his labor were both capital contributions.

Id.

The Tenth Circuit has also addressed this issue in reviewing
a decision of the tax court.

Farris v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, 222 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1995).

The Farris court

assessed the partnership agreement between a silent partner who
contributed $50,000 to a partnership and two other partners who
contributed their personal services, expert skill and knowledge,
stating:
In the absence of a contrary provision in the agreement
where one partner contributes money or physical assets
and the other contributes personal services, skill and
knowledge, they share in the capital assets according
to the value placed on each contribution.
Id. at 322 (citing Paul v. Cullum, 132 U.S. 539 (1889) (holding
"contribution of services by one partner constituted a
contribution to the capital structure and made him one of the
joint owners and possessors of the property of the partnership.")
Other state courts have also recognized that under
appropriate circumstances, personal services of a laboring
partner "may constitute a capital contribution to the
partnership."

Schvmanski v. Conventz, 674 P.2d 281, 284 (Alaska

1983) (emphasis original).

Personal services may be capital

contributions if there exists an express or implied agreement to

that effect.
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In the instant case, treating Joel's sweat equity as a
capital contribution would be consistent with the abovedescribed, limited exceptions to the general rule.

Recognizing

that the exception should apply in this case would not jeopardize
the stability of the general rule.

Joel's situation involved a

clearly expressed and undisputed understanding between the
partners that one's labor equals the other's money.

Because Fred

and Joel honored this commitment throughout Fred's life, it is
appropriate, if necessary, to recognize and honor that commitment
in dissolving the partnership because of Fred's death.
Therefore, if this Court reaches this issue, it should declare
Joel's labor a capital contribution that is equal to Fred's
capital contribution.

This determination would permit this Court

to affirm the trial court's conclusions as to dissolution of the
partnership assets.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the trial court's decisions finding
a partnership between Fred and Joel that includes the property
and declaring one-half of Fred's capital contributions a gift to
Joel.

If the gift decision is reversed, this Court may affirm

the trial court's conclusions on winding up and dissolving the
partnership by alternative theories, including reversing the
trial court's conclusion that Joel's labor was not a capital
contribution.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
Offer to Purchase Real Property

OFFER TO PURCHASE REAL.PROPERTY

I

3 Q

I

1. BUYER. Joel C. Parker and Fred E. Parker, e*BuyerH) htreby offers to
purchase from SF Pacific Properties Inc., ("Seller"), the real property
hereinafter described upon the following terms and conditions.
2. PROPERTY. The real property ("Property") which Is the subject of this
offer consists of 973.26 acres, more or less, located near Little Mountain,
County of Weber, State of Utah, together with all appurtenances thereto and
Improvements thereon. 1f any. The Property Is more particularly described on
Exhibit "A".
3. PURCHASE PRICE.
3.1 The Purchase Price to be paid by Buyer to Seller for the Property
Is S116.893.00.
4. DEPOSITS.
4.1 HI thin five (5) calendar days of acceptance of this offer by
Seller, Buyer shall deliver to Escrow Holder (as defined In Paragraph 5). a
cashier's check In the sum of $2,500.00, which shall apply toward the Purchase
Price. All deposits required under this paragraph 4 shall be hereinafter
referred to as the "0epos1t".
4.2 Escrow Holder is hereby authorized and Instructed to disburse to
Seller the total of the Deposit, less $500.00, as provided In Paragrapn 7.2.
Buyer hereby releases Escrow Holder for any claims arising out of Escrow
Holder's compliance with the provisions of this Paragraph 4.2 and Paragraph 7.2.
BUYER'S INITIALSrfT/,^"

SELLER'S INITIALS fe\\W

4.3 The balance of the Purchase Price, Including Buyer's Escrow fees
and other closing costs, If any, shall be deposited with Escrow Holder, by
cashier's check no later than 2:00 o'clock P.M. on the business day prior to
the Closing Date (as defined In Paragraph 8.1).
4.4 In the event Buyer shall fall to deliver the Deposit on or before
the dates set forth In this Paragraph 4 or promptly to perform any other
covenant or obligation contained In this Agreement. Seller may elect to
specifically enforce this Agreement or to terminate this Agreement and retain
as liquidated damages the amounts provided In Paragraph 4.5 of this Agreement.
No waiver by Seller of any delinquency or default on the part of Buyer shall be
construed as a waiver of any subsequent delinquency or default.
4.5 IN THE EVENT SELLER ELECTS TO TERMINATE THIS AGREEMENT AS A RESULT
OF A DELINQUENCY OR DEFAULT BY BUYER AS PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 4.4. OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, IN THE EVENT BUYER FAILS TO PERFORM ANY COVENANT OR OBLIGATION
PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT, IT IS EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SELLER HILL INCUR
SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF SUCH DELINQUENCY, DEFAULT OR.JAILURE OF
PERFORMANCE. AND IT IS FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH DAMAGES WILL BE EXTREMELY
OIFFICULT TO CALCULATE AND ASCERTAIN. THEREFORE, IT IS EXPRESSLY AGREED THAT
BUYER SHALL PAY TO SELLER LIQUIDATED DAMAGES IN THE SUM OF $2,000.00. NHICH
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE ARE REASONABLE IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FACTS KNOWN TO THEM
ON THE DATE OF THE AGREEMENT, AND SUCH OAMAGES SHALL BE RETAINED BY SELLER FROM
THE DEPOSIT.
BUYER'S INITIALS. i Q j

""* SELLER'S INITIALS /foil

5. ESCROW.
5.1 The purchase and sale of the Property shall be consummated by means
of an escrow ("Escrow") to be opened by Buyer within five (5) calendar days of
acceptance of this offer by Seller at the office of Associated Title Company,
4105 Harrison Blvd.. Sulto 200, Ogden, Utah

8*403 ("Escrow Hrtld«r").

5.2 Upon acceptance of this offer by Seller, Buyer shall request that
Escrow Holder promptly prepare escrow instructions, on Its customary form, for
the purchase and sale of the Property upon the terms and provisions hereof.
The escrow Instructions shall be promptly signed by Buyer and Seller. The
escrow Instructions shall not modify or amend the provisions of this Agreement
unless otherwise expressly set forth therein. At the option of Escrow Holder
this document may be considered as Its escrow instructions, with such further
instructions as Escrow Holder shall require In order to clarify the duties and
responsibilities of the Escrow Holder.
6. PRELIMINARY TITLE REPORT AND DOCUMENTS. Within a reasonable period of
time after the opening of escrow, Seller shall furnish Buyer with a preliminary
title report ("PTR") concerning the Property Issued by Associated Title Company
("Title Company") together with copies of all documents referred to in such PTR.
7. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO FINAL PERFORMANCE OF THIS AGREEMENT.
7.1 The following are conditions precedent to the final performance of
rhu Agreement, and are not conditions precedent to Its formation:
(a)

Buyer's approval of the PTR, including legal description of the
Property, which approval or disapproval shall be given within ten
(10) calendar days of receipt thereof.

7.2 In the event that such written approvals or disapprovals as
required in Paragraph 7.1 above are not received by Seller and Escrow Holder on
or before the date due, it shall be conclusively presumed that Buyer has
unconditionally approved each of said matters. Upon approval of such matters,
by either express written approval or by failure to deliver timely disapproval,
Escrow Holder shall disburse to the Seller the Deposit, less $500.00, as
provided 1n Paragraph 4.2.
7.3 In the event that Buyer delivers timely disapproval or conditional
approval of the PTR, or any part thereof, or any of the Items referred to in
Paragraph 7.1, then for a period of ten days after receipt of such written
notice by Seller, Seller, by written notice to Buyer, may elect to cure said
disapproved or conditionally approved Items prior to the close of escrow. If
Seller does not elect to cure all of said items, then for a period of ten days
after said written notice to Buyer, Buyer shall have the right either to accept
title to the Property subject to said items, thereby waiving any and all claims
against Seller by reason thereof, or to terminate this Agreement. Buyer shall
give written notice to Seller of Buyer's election within ten days after either
<1> receipt of Notice of Seller's election not to cure, or (11) the expiration
of the time In which Seller snail have been rvqulivd lo respond to Buyor's
notice of disapproval or conditional approval. If Buyer shall fail to give
Seller such written notice of Buyer's election within the time specified, it
shall be conclusively presumed that Buyer has elected to terminate this
Agrwiwnt
Tf Buyer elects to terminate this Agreement, thereafter neither
Buyer nor Seller shall have any further liability hereunder, except that Buyer
shall be entitled to the prompt return of a11 funds deposited by Buyer with

Escrow Holder, less only escrow cancellation fees and costs and title company
charges, all of which Buyer hereby agrees to pay.
8. CLOSING.
8.1 Escrow Holder shall dose the escrow on or before June 28. 1991
("Closing Oate").
8.2
escrow:

Seller shall deliver or cause to be delivered to Buyer through

(a)

A Grant Deed 1n proper form duly executed and recordable conveying
to Buyer fee title to the Property subject only to (1) the
exceptions approved by Buyer pursuant to Paragraph 7 hereof, and
(11) a reservation by Seller of all mineral rights and certain
other covenants In the form attached hereto as Exhibit "B".

(b)

A standard coverage owner's form poltcy of title tnsurance Issued
by the Title Company In the full amount of the Purchase Price
Insuring title vested In Buyer subject only to the printed
provisions of such policy and to the exceptions approved by Buyer
pursuant to Paragraph 7 hereof.

8.3 Buyer shall deliver or cause to be delivered to Seller through
escrow the Purchase Price as set forth In Paragraph 3 hereof.
8.4 Both parties shall execute and deliver through escrow any other
documents or instruments which are reasonably necessary In order to consummate
the purchase and sale of the Property.
9. CONDITION OF PROPERTY; BUYER'S INTENDED USE.
9.1 Buyer acknowledges that 1t offers and desires to purchase the
Property "as Is" and without representation or warranty from Seller with
respect to the condition of the Property Including, but not limited to, the
condition of the soil, presence of hazardous materials or contaminants, and
other physical characteristics. Buyer shall perform and rely solely upon Its
own independent Investigation concerning the physical condition of the Property.
9.2 Seller has not and does not hereby make any representation or
warranty to Buyer concerning the Property or Its compliance with any statutes,
ordinance or regulation. Buyer shall perform and rely solely upon Its own
Independent Investigation concerning the Property's compliance with any
applicable law.
9.3 Buyer represents that Its Intended use of the Property 1s grazing.
Buyer shall perform and rely solely upon Its own Investigation concerning Its
intended use of the Property, the Property's fitness therefore, and the
availability of such intended use under applicable statutes, ordinances and
regulations.
10. PRORATIONS AND EXPENSES.
10.1 Real property taxes shall be prorated as of the Closing Date, based
upon the latest tax bill available. Assessments of record which are not yet
due shall be assumed by Buyer, or paid off by Seller, at Buyer's option.

10.2 All title report and title Insurance costs, recording fees,
documentary transfer taxes, escrow fees and any costs connected with the
closing of this sale shall be charged to or divided between the Seller and
Buyer by the Escrow Holder as 1s customary 1n the County of Ogden.
11. POSSESSION.
Closing Oate.

Possession of the Property shall be delivered to Buyer at the

12. INTEGRATION. The contract resulting from Seller's acceptance hereof
contains the entire agreement of the parties and cannot be amended or modified
except by a written agreement.
13. BROKERAGE COMMISSIONS. The parties acknowledge and represent that there
Is no person who Is entitled to a commission, finder's fee or other like
compensation arising In any matter from this Agreement. Each party agrees to
defend, Indemnify and hold the other party harmless from and against each claim
for commission or finder's fee, and the costs and expense Incurred by the other
party 1n connection with such claims which are asserted against the other party
by a person or party other than the Broker who alleges that It was engaged or
retained by such party, or that 1t was the procuring cause for instrumental In
consummating this Agreement.
14. INTERPRETATION. This Agreement shall be construed. Interpreted and
applied In accordance with the laws of the State Utah.
15. ASSIGNABILITY. Buyer shall not assign Its rights or interests under this
Agreement without the express written consent of Seller. In the event Seller's
consent to an assignment by Buyer of Its rights and Interest pursuant to this
Agreement is given, such consent shall not relieve or excuse Buyer of any of
its obligations arising under this Agreement unless such written consent shall
expressly so provide.
16. TIME. Time 1s of the essence of this Agreement.
17. SEVERABILITY. In the event that any provision of this Agreement 1s found
to be Invalid or unenforceable, such determination shall nut affect the
validity and enforceability of any other provision of this Agreement.
18. RIGHT OP ENTRY.
18.1 Buyer and Its Agents may enter on the Property at all reasonable
times while this Agreement Is In effect to plant grass, make tests, surveys,
studies ami Inspections In connection with the Property, provided that prior to

the exercise of said right and at all times while Buyer or Its agents are
present upon the Property, Buyer shall arrange for, keep and maintain In full
force and effect a policy of comprehensive general liability Insurance with a
combined single limit of not less than $2,000,000, and shall furnish to Seller
a certificate of such Insurance which names Seller as an additional insured ana
provides that such policy shall not be cancelled or amended without thirty (30)
days prior written notice to Seller. Buyer shall Indemnify and defend Seller
against and hold Seller harmless from, any and all liability, cost and expense
for loss of or damage to any property or injury to or death of any person,
arising out of or In any way related to the exercise of the right to enter the
Property granted hereunder un1«» >uch liability, eost and oxponce 1c caused by
the sole, active negligence of Seller.
All

costs

Incurred

in

connection

with

tests,

surveys,

studies.

Inspections, reviews, approvals, determinations and applications made by or on
behalf of Buyer under this Agreement or in connection with Buyer's proposed use
of the Property shall be paid by Buyer. In the event of the recordation of any
claim of lien for materials supplied or labor or professional services
performed on behalf of Buyer, Buyer shall promptly satisfy and discharge such
Hen at Buyer's sole cost and expense upon demand therefore by Seller.
18.2 Reports and Studies. Buyer shall provide to Seller a copy, of each
report, study, regulation or ordinance obtained by Buyer In connection with Its
approvals under Paragraph 7. In addition, 1f the purchase and sale of the
Property Is not consummated for any reason, Buyer shall deliver to Seller free
of charge all of the engineering, architectural, financial and other studies,
drawings, reports, surveys and similar materials prepared by or on behalf of
Buyer with respect to the Property and Buyer's proposed project to the extent
Buyer 1s legally entitled to do so.
19. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 1446. Seller Is not a "foreign person" as
that term Is used In Internal Revenue Code Section 1445 C I R C Section 1445")
and Seller agrees to furnish Buyer, prior to Close of Escrow, a Non-Foreign
Certification or any other documentation required under IRC Section 1445 to
evidence that Seller Is not a "foreign person."
20. INTERSTATE LAND SALES FULL DISCLOSURE ACT. Seller conducts its Operation
in accordance with the requirements of the Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act, and, in this connection, Buyer shall execute and deliver to
Seller an affidavit In the form attached hereto as Exhibit "C" 1n order to
qualify the sale of the Property for exemption from said Act.
21. PRELIMINARY CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP. Buyer shall execute and deliver to
Escrow Holder an appropriate Preliminary Change of Ownership Form.
22. NOTICES. Any notice required or permitted to be given hereunder shall be
In writing and shall be effective upon personal delivery or upon three (3) days
after deposit in the United States Mall, postage prepaid and addressed as
follows:
TO SELLER:

SF Pacific Properties Inc.
c/o Catellus Development Corporation
Attn: Regional Sales Manager
201 Mission Street - Suite 250
San Francisco, CA 94105

TO BUYER:

Joel C. Parker and Fred E. ParJttr
4343 West 1800 South
Ogden. Utah 84401

The foregoing addresses may be changed by written notice.
23. ACCEPTANCE.
23.1
This offer to purchase by Buyer shall remain Irrevocably open
until 5:00 p.m. on April 5, 1991, and If not accepted by Seller by said date
shall be deemed revoked.
23.2 Seller may accept this offer to purchase by delivering to Buyer
In person or depositing Into the United States mall one copy of this
Agreement executed by Seller on or before the date set forth 1n Paragraph

BUYER:
Datad:

SELLER:
Accepted this 41ti day of

, 19 dl
SF Pacific Propartlts Inc..
By Cat* 11 us Dmlopmtnt Corporation, Its agent
Bv:
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T1 t l 8;

UT0570OO6P, UT0570014P, UT0570015P
WPPCXF43

SALES ft LAND MANAftFMfNT

. EXHIBIT B

WHZN UOOROSD. UAXL TO

»Aba»• tor Ranter's Urn

SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
a
•ad aanoai andar aw tew* af tha ntia «f Utah. art* to pcaMpat ofiba at
of Offnafr of
BOM of (Hob
; hato* CONV1YB AND WAUUNTf tfLtttft tht A M of * • O m a r ter *>

af

far**

teMtovtBtdawlbtdttict
iiataof Utah:

mat of
DOUABS

of k i d to

Thi atttean who t i f t tfali ted barter avtUr frit tfafe ted oad tba matter
at duir aotbottaad s a t e t roan Era oa dot? adupte by tht baoit «f dUwtrt at
• at a ijwftri iaa«lBt dtly hatd aad uroUid »r o ^Btoaav
la tattai woorwfa tht trtmor haa oaottd itaeorporataoaUoaaBdaomJlafaa
by J» doty aotBortaad offiem this
Jay at
t A. JX I t
Attatt:

Br

(CWOOAftaiAL)

I f ATI OF UTAH.

Oata*

daraf

F

.A.C

wfca Mtat ay a » day awan did » r . aaah far Uaaalf, that ha, thaaaid
tatha
Bnatdaauaad ha, thaaaid
latha<
a(
and that tht wttfeia ai
vas alfMd la hahatf af aald aoraaratlaa hr aatharttr at a m i l i u m at na haaitj i
aaah dab artuawrladfd ta — that aaid earaamttaa-

i» tha atai «f aald <

I I tha aaaa aad that tha aaal attai

EXHIBIT C
AFFIDAVIT
Stata of

'.^'o-kc.'

County of

>^

fil*'*^

>

j-p,c. r £ . , * « *

<«— ° f » ffUnt> -

sworn hereby declares:
^c/i/j*'?*?*

beift

'

f 1 r s t du,y

/nami of our chaser or lessee) Is a

partnership, trust or other business entity).
2. That said _ J * . W
W 'fS^^rS'^SSii
£ M
other business entltjfc if Purcjas^'or th1$
^^JJferen"
ncorporated
herein,
r
9
C
in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by^
^
^f
%
U.
lease
or
tn
0
t Btnt to
e

^ ^ ^ ^

u

u T ^ ^ ^ ' ^ ^ ^ ^

'" C0"mercU1 or

Industrial business.

*HW
Executed on this

atjl^jlu

\K'
dav ff |Vl^>tg^
• * ft +. W OT — <

. 3SZ&-

tubscrU.d »r.d sworn to Mfore «. on

% •«

19j_L

Notary Pyonc

PV- > ^ 2 1 — • " - i - -

ADDENDUM B
Agreement of Purchase and Sale

AGREEMENT OF PURCHASE AMD SALE
THIS AGREEMENT OF PURCHASE AMD BhhZ (hereinafter
toMtiaee rafarrad to as the • Agreement" J, made and entered into
thie Z^+^day of I V ^ c ^ b t ^
1995, by and between JOEL
PARKER (hereinafter some time a referred to aa the ••Seller1') and
TIM G00CH, an individual, and OOOCH LAND AVD LiVBSTOCK, I.e.,
a
Utah limited liability company (aaid individual and aaid limited
liability company hereinafter aonetimes jointly and severally
referred to aa the uBuyer"),
WITNESSETH:
W H E R K A S , Seller ia the owner of certain oattle, which
the Seller deairea to aell and the Buyer deairee to puxcheae upon
the terma and conditions hereinafter Set forth;
NOW, T H E R S F O B B , in consideration of the premise* and
for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto
do hereby mutually agree ea foil ova:

1.
Purchase and fl»i« The Seller hereby agrees to
Bell, transfer and convey to the Buyer, and the Buyer hereby
agrees to purchase from the Seller, upon the terms and condition*
hereinafter aet forth, ail of the Seller* a right, title, intercat
and eguity in and to the following described cattle (hereinafter!
sometimes referred to aa the "Cattle"):
73 oowi
65 oalvea
2 heifera
1 bull
6 ateera
2.
Purchase Price. The Buyer agrees to pay to the
Seller for the Cattle the total puxchaee prloe of FIFinr-EIGHT
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-6BVEN DOLLARS C$50,437.00)
(hereinafter aometines referred to aa the "Purchase Price")
pursuant to the terns of a written promiaaory note free the Buy*?
to the Cellar, in the form attached hereto aa Exhibit "A"
(hereinafter sometimes referred to ae the "Promiaaory mote"), to
be executed by the Buyer and delivered to the seller upon
execution hereof/ providing for payment of aald Purchase Price,
together with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per ennmm
from December 1, 1995, in seven (7) annual paymenta, on or before
December 1 of each year commencing with the yeex 1996, of all
interest accrued thereunder to the date of payment plus principal

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

as
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in a n amount (not t o exoeed TE» THOUSAND DQLL&RS ($10,000.00) pec
year) equal t o one-half (1/2) of all net pro fit • made b y the
Maker during the previoua year from the sale or use of the Cattle
(or their substitutes or replacements); followed b y one (1)
payment, o n o r before November 1, 2003, gf all remaining interest
due thereunder and the entire remaining principal balance of the
Purchase Price.
3.
Effective Date. This transaction shall b e
effective as of November 1, 199$ (the "effective Date"),
regardless o f the date on which this Agreement is executed. All
personal property taxes, insurance premiums and other expenses,
If any, o r o r relating to the Cattle shall h e prorated between
the Seller and the Buyer as of the Effective Date and paid within
sixty (60) days after the Effective Date.
4. flellfu"fl Indemnification R e a d i n g Title. The
parties acknowledge that Seller holds legal title to the Cattle,
but that the heirs of Fred S. Parker, deceased, may hold a n
equitable interest therein as a result of a partnership o r other
relationship between Seller and said Fred E. Parker prior t o his
death. Seller agrees to indemnify, protect, and save and hold
Buyer harmless against and in respect of any and all claims,
lOSBes, liabilities, damages, costs, deficiencies o r expanses
(including attorney's fees) that may result from the d a l e s of
said heirs to the Cattle.
5.
V*\* ?"A *n"*§mirttl
Unless otherwise agreed in
writing by the parties, seller shall deliver title and possession
of each of the Cattle t o Buyer as each animal is removed by the
Buyer from the aforesaid premises and the brand inspection
certificate applicable to that animal is issued.
6.

Security-

A.
The promissory mote shall be secured b y the
Buyer 1 a transfer to the Seller of an equitable interest as a
secured party in all of the Cattle which are the subject of thlaj
traaB&fltion, and in all accounts receivable, proceeds, payments
In kind, o r government entitlements due under o r related thereto
including any proceeds and produots therefrom and any afteracquired, substitute, o r replacement property of the same nature,
kind, class, o r description, The Sailer* e security interest i n
said assets shall be a first lien thereon.
B.
The Promissory mote shall be further securef
by tae Buyer 1 s transfer t o the Seller of an equitable interest as
a secured party in all other cattle and other livestock owned by
the Buyer, and in all accounts receivable, prooeeds, payments In
kind, o r government entitlements due under or related thereto,
9CJ\U0€5.1

-2-

including any proceeds and products therefrom and any afteracquired, substitute, or replacement property of the same nature,
kind, class, or description. The Seller's security interest in
said aaeats shall be a second lion thereon until the existing
first lien thereon shall be paid, whereupon the 8eller' s security
interest, therein shall become a first lien thereon.
C,
The security inters*ts provided for
hereinabove shall be documented by a Security Agreement in the
fere attached hereto as Exhibit "Ba and by this reference
incorporated herein and such financing statements and other
documents or instruments as the Seller may require to perfect
said security interest.
D.
Bxospt aa otherwise agreed In writing by
Buyer end Seller, the Buyer shall obtain ana maintain a casualty
insurance polloy to cover all assets securing the Promissory Note
as hereinabove provided with loss payable to the Seller in an
amount not less than the unpaid balance under the Promiseory
Note, in the event of damage to or loflB gf any Of said aasets*
the Seller shall be entitled to the proceeds of said policy to
the extent of the amount necessary to pay said Promissory Note in
full.
E.
The Buyer shall purchase and maintain in
force a life insurance polloy issued by a company satisfactory to
tha Seller, providing for the payment of death benefits in an
amount not less than One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00)
upon tha death of Tim Gooch, one o£ the Buyers herein. Ontli the
Promissory Note is paid in full, the owner and beneficiary of
aaid policy shall be the Seller, and ell of said death benefits
shall be paid to the seller upon the death of said Tin Gooch
(regardless of the then outstanding balance due under the
Promissory Mote). The Promissory rote shall be deemed satisfied
to the extent of the life insurance prooeeds so paid to the
Seller. The Buyer shall pay to the seller the amount of each
premium due under said polioy at leeet ten (10) days prior to the
due date thereof. Upon payment in full of the Promissory note,
the Seller shall, at the Buyer e option, transfer the ownership
of said life insurance policy to the Buyer.
7.
Cattlpfinifl»^f n » . The Cattle which are the
subject of this Agreement are being sold "as is"; the Seller
hereby expressly denies any express or implied warranties
concerning performance or fitness of the came. The Buyer is
familiar with and has inspected and accept* -the cattle N ae is"
and in their condition as of the Effective Date.
8.
Aufrhnrifcy of yflin1l-ed T^lanilitv CABPATIV. The Buyer
representee and warrants that Gooch Land and Liveetook, U C. , is
M6U00CS.1
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organised end existing under the laws of the 8tste of Utah and
ha* full power and authority to enter into this agreement, that
thla agreement is valid and enforceable against said Buyer in
accordance with its terms, and that the execution and delivery of
this agreement and all related documents and instruments does
not, end the oonaumaatioa of the transaction contemplated hereby
will not, violate any provision of any charter, bylaw, mortgage,
lien, lease, agreement, instrument, order, judgment, or decree to
which the Buyer is a party or by which he is bound, and will not
violate any restriction of any kind or character whatsoever to
which said Buyer is subjact.
9.
Bayers ygeprda. The Buyer agrees to keep full
and complete books and record* of his use and sale of the said
Cattle and of all enacts securing the Promissory Note, and shall
permit the Seller and hie representatives to have access at all
reasonable times to any and all such books, records and other
related information in order to review and make copies thereof
for the purpose of confirming the Buyer1 s compliance with the
provisions hereof or for any other reasonable purpose.

10.

Indemnification.

A.
The Seller will indemnify, protect, and save
and hold the Buyer harmless against and in respect of any and all
liabilities of the Seller of any nature* whether accrued,
absolute, contingent, or otherwise, existing on the Effective
Date, incurred in the ownership or use of the Cattle, except as
otherwise specifically set forth herein.
B.
The Buyer will indemnify, protect and nave
and hold the Seller harnless against and in rospeot o£ any and
all liabilities of the Buyer of any nature, whether accrued,
absolute, contingent, or Otherwise, accruing after the effective
Date, lnourred in the ownership or use of the Cattle or any of
the assets securing the Buyer* s obligations hereunder, except ee
otherwise specifically set forth herein.
C.
Bach party will indemnify, protect, and save
and hold the other party harnless against and In respect of any
and all claims, losses, liabilities, damages, costs,
deficiencies, or expenses resulting from any misrepresentation,
material omission, breach of warranty, or nonfulfillment of any
covenant or agreement on the part of the Indemnifying party under
or relating to tnis agreement, and any and all actions, suits,
proceedings, demands, assessments, judgments, costs, legal and
accounting fees, and other expenses incident to any of the
foregoing.

9«S\10N3.1
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11. flatlflftfl* Any anfl a l l notices, designations,
o f f e r s , acceptances, or any other communications to be given t o
e i t h e r of the p a r t i e s hereto shall he personally delivered t o
such party or n a i l e d t o BUCh party by r e g i s t e r e d or c e r t i f i e d
mail, return r e c e i p t requested, at the addraaa indicated below:
Notices t o s e l l e r :
Joel C. Parker
8083 West 900 South
Ogden. Utah 84404
Notices t o Buyer:
Tim Qoooh
Gooch Land and Livestock Ii,C.
1657 North 4500 West
Meet Point, Utah 840IS
Either party may change the place of address aforesaid by written
notice to the other party. Notice shall be deemed to have been
given upon the date of personal delivery thereof or upon
depositing the same in the United States mails as aforesaid.
12* interpretation. The provisions of this agreement
shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of
the State of Utah. The paragraph headings ocntained herein are
for purposes of reference only and shall not limit, expand, or
Otherwise affect the interpretation of any provision hereof.
Whenever the context requires, the singular shall include the
plural, the plural shall include the singular, the whole shall
include any part thereof# any gender shall include the masculine,
feminine and neuter gender, and the term "person11 ahall include
any individual, firm, partnership (general or limited), joint
venture, corporation, limited liability company, truat9
asaociation, or other entity or association or any combination
thereof. If any provision of this agreement or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance shall he invalid or
unenforceable to any extent, the remainder of this agreement and
the application of such provision to other persons or
circumstances chall not be affected thereby and shall be enforced
to the extent permitted by applicable law.
13. XaiXftr. A waiver of any breach of any of the
tarns or conditions of this agreement shall not operate or be
construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach thereof.
14. £££nol. The provisions of this agreement shall
bind and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their
respective permitted successors and assigns* The parties hereby
MSUWtt.l
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agree for themselves, add for their successors and assigns, to
execute any instrument8 and to perform any pat which nay bo
necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of this agreement.
15. amanflmanfcs. This agreement pete forth the entire
understanding of the parties with respect tjo the subject matter
hereof, and all prior negotiations, understandings,
representations, inducements and agreements], whether oral or
written and whether made by a party hereto (or by any one acting
on behalf of a party, shall be deemed to he nerged in this
agreement and a hall be Of no further force or eff ect. H O
amendment, modification, or Change in this agreement shall be
valid or binding unless reduced to writing and alined by all of
the parties hereof.
16. B«wjmme rtf BnfftrfiPffiMt:
the parties agree that
should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements
contained herein, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and
expenses, including a reasonable attorney'a fee, which may arise
or aoorue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in
pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law,
whether such remedy la pursued by filing suit or otherwise, and
regardleee of whether such coats, fees andyor expenses are
incurred in oonnectlon with any bankruptcy! proceeding,
17. fg ff»flt>,lPfctm- *be parties agree that
no
presumption shall be attached to this agreement because it say
hare been prepared by one of the parties or by one party1 s
attorney.
18. Bpeoifio pfgformmno, Sach party' s obligations
under this agreement are unique, zn the event that any party
should default in its obligations under this agreement, the
parties each acknowledge that it would bejextremaly impracticable
to measure in full all of the resulting damages; accordingly, the
nondefaulting party/ in addition to any other available rights or
remedies, may sue in equity for specific performance and the
parties each expressly waive the defense that a remedy in damages
will be adequate (without, however, waiving ita respective right
to pursue the remedy of damages if it electa to do so).
19. *!»« nt RBBiince. Tire is hecahy expressly
declared to be of the essence of this agreement and of each and
every provision hereof.
20. Counterparts; Facsimile (fexl Deeumnni-.a. This
agreement may be executed in any number of oounttrparts, each of
which when executed and delivered shall ^c deemed to be an
original, and all of which shall together constitute one and the
same instrument. Facsimile transmission |of any signed original
M5YU06U

-6-

document, end retransmission of any elgned faosimila
transmission, shall be the sane an delivery of an original.
21. Authority nf Slonsra. if any party lwxeto Is a
corporation, partnership, limited liability company, trust,
estate or other entity, the person executing this agreement on
behalf of such party warrants hie or her authority to do so en*
to M a d such party.
in KITUEB8 WHEREOF, the parties have executed this
agreement this ^ 2 7 ^ day of
DttcxKbir
, i$«.
fiKLLER;

GOOCH LAUD A H 0 LIVESTOCK, I- C. , a
otah limited liability company

By:

805M0065.1
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